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In summary, the following general conclusions concerning the
effect of a copyright of a statute compilation are apparent from the
few cases decided on tis question: although the statutes themselves
are not copyrightable as a matter of public policy, the portions of
the compilation which- are deemed to be the fruits of the compiler's
labor, such as annotations, headnotes, cross-references, arrangement,
or index, will be protected by a copyright.
ROBERT M. SPRAGENS
BAR OF THE DEBT AS AFFECTING THE MORTGAGE
When the Statute of Limitations has run against a debt secured
by a mortgage, a question arises as to whether the mortgagee may
proceed on the mortgage for the amount of the debt. The answer
apparently depends on two factors: (1) whether the running of the
Statute of Limitations entirely extinguishes the debt itself or
merely the personal liability of the mortgagor and (2) whether the
situation affords the mortgagee two separate and distinct remedies,
one on the mortgage against the land and the other against the
mortgagor personally
As to the effect of the Statute of Limitations, the great majority
of courts hold that where the period provided by the statute for
the bringing of the action has elapsed, the debt itself is not extin-
guished; the statute merely bars the remedy of the obligee to sue
on the personal obligation.' The mortgagee, therefore, may pro-
ceed to recover the same by any other remedy he may have.
The great majority of the courts agree that the mortgage and
the debt it secures are separate obligations. It is said that the
mortgagee has two remedies, one in personam against the mort-
gagor and one n rem against the land.3 The personal action against
the mortgagor usually must be brought within a comparatively short
period of time, depending upon the provisions of the statute. How-
ever, since the right to hold the mortgage as security and proceed
against the land for the amount of the debt is a right 7n rem, the
mortgagee has a longer period in which to bring is action to enforce
this remedy because in most states the Statute of Limitations does
not run against land for a period of fifteen or twenty years. In some
states the period for recovery on mortgages is prescribed by statute.'
134 Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions, sec. 11.
'Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U.S. 756, 28 L. Ed. 1141 (1884), Austin v.
Edwards, 201 Ala. 532, 78 So. 886 (1918)" Pratt v. Huggins, 29 Barb.
(N. Y.) 277 (1859). Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N.Y. 295, 28 N.E. 638, 14
L.R.A. 59 (1891).3Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721 (1835),
Maloney v. Home Loan & Trust Co., 97 Ind. App. 564, 186 N.E. 897
(1933)
'Austin v. Steele, 68 Ark. 348, 58 S.W 352 (1900), London &
S.F Bank v. Bandmann, 120 Cal. 220, 52 Pac. 583, 65 Am. St. Rep.
179 (1898).
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In others, equity prevents recovery under the doctrine of laches,
depending on the circumstances of the case, but ordinarily only
after the statutory period for the recovery of land has elapsed This
situation is analogous to that in torts where one has an alternative
right to bring trover for the conversion of a chattel, or assumpsit
for the proceeds of sale.' In the above stated case the injured party
may pursue one of Ins remedies notwithstanding the other is un-
available through lapse of time.
Furthermore, this is true even though the merger of law and
equity in most states, under codes requiring that complete relief be
given, has eliminated these separate actions as a practical matter.
Statutes providing for foreclosure usually provide for a deficiency
judgment against the mortgagor or other person liable for the debt.7
In an equitable action at common law in a suit on the mortgage
alone the mortgagee was limited in his recovery to the value of the
land and could not, without a separate action at law against the
mortgagor, subject the latter to any deficiency 8
However, a few courts have held that the running of the Statute
of Limitations against the debt prevents any subsequent action on
the mortgage.9 In some instances these decisions are correctly de-
cided under statutes providing that the period of limitations as to
mortgages shall be the same as that of the note or debt they secureP
Thus, when the period has run against the note, the mortgage is
automatically barred by statute. Also, in some jurisdictions the
Statute of Limitations operates, not only to prevent any particular
remedy the obligee may have, but it is considered as having extin-
guished the debt itself and all rights and liabilities connected there-
with." In these two jurisdictions set forth above it may be said that
the cases are correct in declaring that the mortgage is barred when
the debt is barred.
On the other hand, in Kentucky, where there is not such a
statutory provision and where the Statute of Limitations is ordi-
narily considered as affecting merely the remedy and not the right
or the thing itself, it has been held that no action may be main-
5Tate v. Hawkins, 81 Ky 577 (1884).
0 Kirkman v. Phillips' Heirs, 54 Tenn. (7 Heisk) 187 (1872)
Simon v. Union Trust Co., 126 Ohio 346, 185 NXE. 425 (1933)
SMaloney v. Home Loan & Trust Co., 97 Ind. App. 564, 186
1NXE. 897 (1933).9McGovney v. Gwillim, 16 Colo. App. 284, 65 Pac. 346 (1901)
Allen v. Shepherd, 162 Ky. 756, 173 S.W 135 (1915)
"Austin v. Steele, 68 Ark. 348, 53 S.W 352 (1900), London
& S.F Bank v. Bandmann, 120 Cal. 220, 52 Pac. 583, 65 Am. St.
Rep. 179 (1898).
" Ordinarily, under such statutes providing that the right as well
as the remedy is extinguished, the courts, interpret the same as
merely preventing the judicial enforcement of the demand and not as
a satisfaction of the right. Eingatner v. Illinois Steel Co., 103 Wis.
373, 79 N.W 433, 74 Am. St. Rep. 871 (1899).
2Barnes v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 283 Ky. 261, 140 S.W (2d),
1041 (1940).
KENTuCKy LAw JOURNAL
tamed on the mortgage when the debt has become barred." The
Kentucky court takes the view that the mortgage is merely "inci-
dental" to and exists wholly for the purpose of securing the debt.
It has no life independent of the debt and unless there can be found
in the mortgage wording sufficient to constitute a written promise
to pay, thus bringing the mortgage within the fifteen year period as
a promise in writing, when the personal remedy is barred the
remedy on the mortgage is also barred.
This theory of the Kentucky court dates back to certain state-
ments in Vandiver v. Hodge,'4 an action on three promissory notes
for land sold and conveyed to the defendants with reservation of a
lien for securing payment. The notes had become due more than
fifteen years before the action was brought. The court, in holding
that any action on the vendor's lien was barred, said:
" no action being maintainable on the notes, the lien, which
is only a mere security, can not be enforced. There is no
express trust. The lien is only a particular sort of resulting
trust; and the statute of limitations applies to all implied trusts.
Besides, had the trust been express, and not within the statute,
still it could not be enforced as the mere incident to the debt,
which is the principal, if the debt itself is paid or barred by
time."Is
The principles of this case were followed in Yeates v. Weeden,"
an action on a note executed in consideration of land sold and con-
veyed and upon which a lien was retained for the security of the
debt. In reversing a judgment for the mortgagee, the upper court
said:
whenever the debt ceased to exist whether it was barred
by time or extinguished by payment, the security was lost. It
would be strange indeed if a debt which had been paid or
barred by time could be resuscitated and enforced by means of
a security that was given at its creation for the payment thereof.
"The security is an incident that follows the legal obligation
to pay, and whenever that obligation ceases, the security, from
the very nature of the case, must cease with it; for there can
be no security for a debt which has no legal existence (citing
Vandiver v. Hodge).""
It is believed that these cases, in setting out the rules later
followed in cases involving mortgages, failed to recognize the real
nature of the situation presented. The fact is that although the
'Allen v Shepherd, 162 Ky 756, 173 S.W 135 (1915). K.R.S.
sec. 413.120 provides: "The following actions shall be commenced
within five years after the cause of action accrued An action
on a bill of exchange or upon a promissory note, placed upon
the footing of a bill of exchange."
167 Ky. (4 Bush) 538 (1868).
"Vandiver v. Hodge, 67 Ky (4 Bush) 538, 540 (1868).
6 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 438 (1869).
'7 Yeates v. Weeden, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 438, 439 (1869).
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mortgage is a separate lien in itself, the note has been treated as
the life of the lien causing the lien to cease when the note became
unenforceable. The court has described the mortgage as a "mere
incident" to the obligation. A mortgage is something more than
that. It is a separate remedy in itself, a security bargained for by
the mortgagee for the very purpose that he shall have some protec-
tion should anything, including the Statute of Limitations, prevent
his recovery against the obligor personally Under the lien theory
of mortgages, followed by Kentucky, a mortgage is the giving of
a lien on land by the obligor with the condition that it shall cease
upon payment of the debt. In states where the title theory pre-
vails, the mortgage amounts to a conditional conveyance subject
to defeasance when the debt is paid. Whether the problem arises
in a jurisdiction following one of these theories or the other is
immaterial. If the mortgagee has title he may recover the prop-
erty in an action of ejectment after the personal obligation is
barred. If he is said to have merely a lien, if the debt is consid-
ered existent, he may recover the amount of that lien from the
land. Thus the question narrows itself to whether the debt has
in fact been paid. And as to this it is urged that the Kentucky
court erred in early mortgage cases in failing to recognize that the
running of the Statute of Limitations does not amount to payment.
In Yeates v. Weeden, contrary to the established rule in Kentucky
as to the effect of the Statute of Lunitations, the court considered
the statute, not only as barring the personal remedy against the
obligor, but also, as completely extinguishing the debt as if it had
actually been paid. But the running of the statute does not pay
the debt. The debt continues to exist although it is unenforceable
as far as the personal liability of the mortgagor is concerned. And
this is the rule adopted by Kentucky and the great majority of
courts as to ordinary contracts where the statute has run against
the personal obligation of the debtor." Since the debt still exists
it follows that the mortgage, given to secure the mortgagee on
failure to collect the debt from the mortgagor, whatever the cause
may be, should be enforced against the land.
One other point to be considered in this connection is that
the Kentucky court has considered the note as the debt itself and
in the earlier cases said that since recovery on the note has been
barred by the Statute of Limitations, the debt is no longer due and
therefore the mortgage cannot be enforced, just as if the debt had
been paid. True, no action may be maintained on the note. How-
ever, the note is not the debt itself. When the creditor accepts the
note of the debtor at the time of the creation of the debt, the accept-
ance of the note is not ordinarily a discharge of the debt." The
"Barnes v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 283 Ky. 261, 140 S.W (2d)
1041 (1940).
"15 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d. ed. 1939) sec. 1406.
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note is merely evidence of the debt. Thus, the mortgage is not
security for the note, but is security for the payment of the debt
itself and is just as much evidence of the debt as is the note.
Therefore, the fact that the obligee has become barred from making
use of the note as evidence of the debt should not defeat his action
as mortgagee to proceed on the mortgage against the land as security
for the same debt.
The court has refused to accept the rulings of the mortgage
cases in the analogous situation where insurance policies are pledged
as security for a debt. In Pollock's Administrator v. Smith," insur-
ance policies were assigned as security for an obligation of the
insured. On his death the company paid the money into court
where the adminstrator of the beneficiary's estate contended that
the creditor should recover only those premiums paid within the
five years prior to the bringing of the action. It was held that
the creditor should have the whole of is debt paid out of the
policy The court mentioned the Kentucky rule in mortgage cases
that when the debt is barred no recovery may be had on the lien,
but, in spite of it, refused to grant relief which would be contrary
to the real equities of the case. The contract was a pledge of
insurance policies to secure a debt and equity will not require that
the pledgee release his pledge until he has in fact been paid. The
court pointed out that any other holding would violate the very
principles of equity and the intention of the contracting parties.
A similar ruling is found in Mercer National Bank v. White's
Executor,' where insurance policies were assigned to secure a debt.
The assignor became bankrupt and thereafter sick benefits to which
he later became entitled under the policy were sent by the com-
panies to the assignees. In an action by the insured to recover the
payments, the court held that the assignees were entitled to keep
the amounts paid as sick benefits. It was said that a deposit of col-
lateral will not prevent the running of the Statute of Limitations
on the debt, but even though the statute has run on the debt the
pledgee may enforce his lien against the property Also, the court
stated that a discharge in bankruptcy would not prevent the pledgee
from enforcing is lien although the personal liability of the bank-
rupt has been extinguished.
As to other types of property pledged it is almost the umversal
rule that the barring of the action on the debt does not affect the
right of the pledgee of collateral security to hold and realize upon
such collateral, nor the right of the pledgor to call for any surplus
money after the principal debt has been paid." The law in respect
-107 Ky 509, 54 S.W 740 (1900).
"236 Ky. 128, 32 S.W (2d) 734 (1930).
"Hodge v Truax, 184 Wash. 360, 51 Pac. (2d) 357 (1935), 103
A.L.R. 420, 430 (1936)
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to the status of a pledge is well stated in In re Hartranft's Estate,2
wherein the court said:
"The holder of a note with whom collaterals have been
deposited has, while the statute is running, two remedies; one
against the maker by suit, the other against the collateral. If
he lose the first by the lapse of time, he still has the second.
He may not sue the maker, but he may exhaust the securities
he holds in pledge; for the statute operates, not upon his debt,
but upon his right of action. The deposit of collaterals has,
therefore, no effect to prevent the running of the statute against
the right of action. The pledge survives though the right
of action is gone; and if the creditor realizes from the collateral
more than the amount of his debt, the debtor may call upon
him for the surplus. He cannot, however, demand a return
of the collaterals until the debt has been paid, notwithstanding
the statute may have run upon his creditor's rights of action
against him."
Although pledges involve personal property rather than realty,
the same reasons exist for upholding the right to realize upon the
security in one case as in the other. In either situation the holder
of the security should have a right to proceed against it as a remedy
independent of and different from the remedy of proceeding against
the person of the debtor. Where the security is a pledge of personal
property, the debtor cannot recover his property until he has paid
in full and likewise where a mortgage on land is given as security
for a debt, the mortgagor cannot have the lien on his land removed
as a cloud on title until he pays the amount due on the mortgage.
From tbis it is clear that equity recognizes the existence of the
debt and that it would be clearly mequitable to allow the mortgagor
to free his title of the mortgage without first paying what is equita-
bly due the mortgagee.
In conclusion it is submitted that the Kentucky court, in fol-
lowing the earlier cases, not only thwarts one of the very purposes
for which the parties bargained, but also, has erred in failing to
recognize that the true relationship of the mortgagor and the mort-
gagee at the maturity of the debt involves two different and inde-
pendent remedies for its recovery. The one is zn personam against
the mortgagor and the other is in rem against the land.
It is believed that the Kentucky Court of Appeals should and
will come to recognize these two separate and distinct reme-
dies. And, since it is clear that the rule in Kentucky as to the
effect of the Statute of Limitations in pledge cases is that it merely
bars the remedy and not the right, if the court applies this rule to
mortgage cases where the mortgagee seeks to enforce the mort-
- 153 Pa. 530, 26 Atl. 104 (1893).
' Id. at 531, 26 Atl. at 105.
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gage as an interest in land after the debt is barred, the court can-
not help but adopt the rule in effect in the majority of jurisdictions,
which seems more just and equitable.
ROBERT S. HAMMOND
CHARACTER OF DECEASED AND UNCOMMUNICATED
THREATS BY DECEASED IN HOMICIDE CASES
As a general rule, evidence of the violent and dangerous charac-
ter of the deceased is inadmissible in homicide cases.' This rule is
predicated upon the fact that the wicked as well as the good are
entitled to the protection of the law, and that it in no degree excuses
the taking of human life that the person slam was of bad character
or reputation. However, an exception to the general rule exists
in cases where the defendant admits the killing but claims to have
acted in self defense. Here the character of the deceased is ma-
terial for two purposes: first, to show the state of mind of the
accused as a cause of his action at the time of the killing, and sec-
ond, to aid in determining which party was the aggressor.
When one charged with murder asserts that he killed in self
defense, Is state of mind is a material factor as to the existence
and reasonableness of apprehension of such violence by the de-
ceased as to justify the defensive measures adopted by the defend-
ant. The law recognizes the fact that men assailed defend them-
selves with alacrity and force in proportion to the violent and
dangerous character of their assailants It follows that an act of
the decedent which, if considered independently of his character
would not be sufficient to warrant extreme defensive measures,
might, when observed and considered in connection with such char-
acter, arouse a belief of imminent peril, thereby 3ustifymg the de-
fensive measures adopted.
In order for the accused to prove his state of mind and thereby
show the reasonableness of his action by the introduction of evi-
dence of the deceased's turbulent character, it is necessary that
the accused first show that he had knowledge of such character
prior to the killing.' A failure to prove prior knowledge would
completely defeat the purpose for which this evidence is admitted.
It has been held in at least one case that such knowledge may be
presumed
The second purpose for which evidence of the violent character
of the deceased is admitted is to determine whether it was the
accused or the deceased who provoked the assault. In this situation
'Lang v. Ala., 84 Ala. 1, 4 So. 193 (1888), 13 R.C.L. Homicide,
See. 219.
2 Gardner v. State, 90 Ga. 310, 17 S.E. 86 (1892).3Karr v. State, 100 Ala. 4, 14 So. 851 (1894)
'Sturgeon v. Commonwealth, 31 K.L.R. 536, 102 S.W 812 (1907).
'Trabune v. Commonwealth, 13 K.L.R. 343, 17 S.W 186 (1891).
